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Abstract
This paper evaluates how R&D subsidies to the business sector are typically
awarded. We identify two sources of inefficiency: the selection based on
a ranking of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the
failure to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and use
information about the necessary funding. In order to correct these ineffi-
ciencies we propose mechanisms that include some form of an auction in
which applicants bid for subsidies. Our proposals are tested in a simulation
and in controlled lab experiments. The results suggest that adopting our
proposals may considerably improve the allocation.
JEL classification: D44, D45, H25, O32, O38
Keywords: Research, Subsidies, Experimental Economics
“Public money is like holy water; everyone helps himself to it.”
Italian Proverb
1. introduction
R&D subsidies to the business sector are an important part of research pol-
icy. For example, the German government spends roughly e2.2 billion per
year or 5% of its total R&D expenditures for supporting industry R&D. 1
Typically, R&D support is organized in programs which pursue a specific
aim such as promoting job creation in particular regions or improving the
research intensity in a particular industry. Some of these programs offer
grants, others provide loans at subsidized interest rates or funding in re-
turn for a profit share. Most programs are geared to support small and
medium sized businesses (SMEs) or cooperative projects involving SMEs.
In this paper, we focus on programs that offer non-refundable grants. This
is a very common form of subsidization. In most of these programs the
allocation of funds is organized in competitions, as follows.2 Applicants
submit written proposals to a program managing institution at some due
date; in these proposals they describe a specific project for which they want
to receive a grant. These proposals are pre-screened and short–listed, and
then evaluated by a team of experts on the basis of their scientific and eco-
nomic merit. Based on the expert advice, a committee grades projects, using
a small set of grades such asA, B, and C . And the committee selects projects
in the order of the assigned grades, down from A to C , until the available
budget is exhausted. Thereby, each funded project receives a subsidy equal
to a predetermined percentage of the scheduled refundable project cost.3
Whilst the focus of this paper is on R&D support policy in Germany, we note
that similar attribution procedures are applied in numerous other countries.
As an example, information on similar programs in the U.K, the U.S. and in
Israel can be found in Binks et al. (2003) and Trajtenberg (2002).
In the present paper we will not debate the merit of directly subsidizing
firms’ R&D activities.4 However, we object to the way in which firms’ projects
are selected and subsidies are determined. As we will argue, neither the
selection procedure nor the competition based on quality criteria only, is
efficient. In this paper, we propose better ways to achieve the given purpose.
1see Czarnitzki and Fier (2001).
2A detailed description and analysis of some of the programs applied in Germany can
be found in e.g. Blum et al. (2001), Becker et al. (2004) and Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005).
3Typically only part of the project cost, such as personnel cost, are eligible for subsidies.
A frequently employed rule is the ”match grant“ where 50% of the refundable project cost
are reimbursed.
4Some researchers, such as Martin and Scott (2000), have suggested that one should sub-
sidize venture capitalists rather than firms. Other researchers investigate into the over-
all effectiveness of R&D subsidies in promoting research in private enterprises. See e.g.
García-Quevedo (2005) for an international survey and Czarnitzki and Licht (2005) for a
survey on the effects of R&D subsidies in Germany.
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Specifically, we see two main deficiencies and propose to modify the cur-
rently used attribution procedure in two ways.
1. Funding the best projects until the budget is exhausted is inefficient.
Instead, the selection should be based on a ranking of complete allo-
cations of funds.
2. Funding the selected projects at a predetermined percentage of project
cost is inefficient. Instead, one should induce applicants to compete
by lowering their requests for funding.
In order to achieve these objectives, we propose to base the selection of
projects on a ranking of allocations, and to embed that selection rule in a
simple auction mechanism. The development of an auction-like mechanism
for awarding subsidies has been suggested by Blum et al. (2001) and Blum
and Kalus (2003). In that mechanisms firms compete with their requests for
funding, which gives them an incentive to reveal private information and
lower their demand for subsidies. In Blum and Kalus (2003), it is proposed
to use an auction similar to an English Auction. In this paper, we develop
this idea further by designing two specific auction mechanisms, one sealed–
bid and one open descending–bid mechanism, and test these mechanisms
by means of a simulation and a controlled lab experiment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss selection rules
and show why one should select on the basis of a ranking of complete alloca-
tions. In Section 3, we explain two specifications of an auction mechanism
and the relation of our auction problem to the existing experimental and
theoretic literature. Section 4 evaluates the proposed selection rule by a
Monte Carlo simulation. Section 5 describes the design of a lab experiment
to test the two auction mechanisms. Section 6 summarizes the results of the
experiment. Section 7 summarizes and Section 8 discusses the implications
of our proposals.
2. ranking projects vs. ranking allocations
We analyze the following allocation problem: The government has offered an
R&D subsidy program that grants subsidies according to some rule, within
the limits of a given budget. Applicants have submitted project proposals,
and the selection committee has evaluated them and has short–listed a set
of projects P := {1, . . . , n} which are judged as eligible for funding. Project
i shall receive a subsidy of si if selected. The selection committee has to
choose a subset of projects that shall be funded within the limits of the
given budget B.
The standard selection rule is based on a ranking of individual projects,
from the set of short–listed projects, as follows: 1) Each project is assigned
a grade from a given set of grades (for the moment one may assume that
each project has a distinct grade). 2) Projects are selected, moving from
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highest to lower grades, until the given budget is exhausted. As a result, no
lower grade project ever crowds out a higher grade. This may seem to be a
desirable property; however, it is generally not optimal.
As an illustration consider the example of four projects, P = {P1, . . . , P4},
which require the following subsidies if selected: s = {100,50,50,50} and
a budget of 150. Suppose the selection committee has the preference order
P1 á P2 á P3 á P4. Then the selection based on the ranking of individual
projects leads to the selection of projects {P1, P2}. However, if {P2, P3, P4}
is preferred to {P1, P2}, it would be better to select {P2, P3, P4} since that
allocation is also feasible at the given budget. This indicates that the se-
lection based on the ranking of individual projects leads astray, because it
does not take into account that a high–grade project may crowd out several
lower–grade projects which are inferior in pairwise comparisons, but lead
to a superior allocation. Indeed, that selection is equivalent to preferring
every single higher–grade to any number of lower–grade projects.
Therefore, as a first step towards achieving a better selection process, the
selection committee has to learn how to think in terms of complete alloca-
tions, and apply the following selection rule:5
Proposal 1 Select projects based on a ranking of allocations, rather than
based on a ranking of projects, as follows: 1) Determine all allocations that are
feasible (can be funded with the given budget). 2) Rank all feasible allocations
and select the projects that are part of the highest ranking feasible allocation.
In practical application this procedure may be fairly complex, since the
number of allocations increases exponentially with the number of projects.
Therefore, we recommend sticking to a fixed grading system, as it is typi-
cally used in the current system, consisting of at most three grades, such
as {A,B,C}. Such a grading system treats projects of the same grade as
perfect substitutes. We were also told by program managers that employ-
ing more than two or three grades was not sensible because this would only
suggest a degree of precision that cannot be achieved. In addition one may
use constant equivalence rules that state how many higher–grade projects
are equivalent to one lower–grade project. Using such constant equivalence
rules corresponds to assuming linear indifference curves in the commodity
resp. grade space. For example, for the grade set {A,B,C} the equivalence
rules (e(b), e(c)) state the number of grade–A projects that are equivalent
to one grade–B, resp. grade–C , project. We also employ this practical device
in our lab experiments which are described in section 5.
Our above proposal requires neither the use of grades nor of constant equiv-
alence rules. Using these makes the selection simple. However, it is only
advisable if the underlying assumptions are justified as an approximation.
As a practical advice, one may consider to prespecify the grade set and the
fixed equivalence rules, and ask those who assess the quality of projects
only to assign grades, taking into account the given equivalence rules.
5To an economist, this proposal is fairly obvious. However, in our experience, program
managers are not aware of the flaws of the current selection procedure.
3
Formal statement of the allocation ranking problem We conclude
this section with a precise statement of the allocation ranking problem. The
notation introduced here will also be used to describe our auction mecha-
nisms.
For this purpose, let P := {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of short–listed projects,
and A the set of subsets (i.e., the power set) of P . Therefore, A is the set
of all conceivable allocations from which the committee has to select one,
under some feasibility constraint.
Ideally, the selection committee has a complete preference ranking, “á”, of
all allocations, such that for all a,a′ ∈ A one has a á a′ or a′ á a that is
reflexive and transitive. Such a preference ranking defined on a set of finite
alternatives can be represented by an (ordinal) utility function, U : A → R
such that ∀a,a′ ∈A: U(a) ≥ U(a′) ⇐⇒ a á a′.
The promised subsidy for project i, if it is part of the allocation, is denoted
by si.
The choice of allocation based on a ranking of individual projects (as in the
status quo procedure) is denoted byas and the choice of allocation according
to Proposal 1 is denoted by ap. Thus, ap is the maximizer of U(a) over all
feasible allocations that can be funded with the given budget B:
ap ∈ arg max
a∈A

U(a) |
∑
i∈a
si ≤ B

 . (1)
As mentioned before, committees often employ a grading scheme as a sim-
plifying device. Together with an equivalence rule of grades this may lead
to a pragmatic construction of a utility function, as follows.
Let G := {g1, . . . , gm} be a set of grades, such as G = {A,B,C} where
g1  g2  . . .  gm. Then, the first step is to grade all projects, which is
summarized by Γ : P → G. Using Γ , one then computes, for each allocation,
its frequency distribution of grades, denoted by γ : A→ Nm.
Next, the committee chooses an equivalence rule e : G → Rm, where e(gj)
states the number of grade–g1 projects that are equivalent to one grade–gj
project. Of course, 1 = e(g1) > e(g2) > · · · > e(gm).
Combining the grading scheme and the equivalence rule, one finds the utility
function
U(a) :=
m∑
j=1
γj(a)e(gj). (2)
U(a) has a nice interpretation: let a′ be an allocation that contains U(a)
grade–g1 projects and no other projects; then, the committee’s preference
order exhibits a′ ∼ a.
Also notice that the selection based on ranking individual projects can be
viewed as a special case of a ranking based on allocations if and only if the
project manager has lexicographic preferences, which give first priority to
grade g1 projects, second priority to grade g2 projects, etc..
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3. two auction mechanisms
We now turn to the second deficiency of the current subsidization policy:
the funding of projects at a predetermined percentage of the refundable
project cost. Generally this leads to excessive funding of those who are
selected, and thus tends to exclude other valuable projects.
Typically, the selection committee cannot know the amount of funding nee-
ded to induce the applicant to carry out its project. They only know that
this unknown amount is not greater than si, the amount of subsidy that
would be granted according to the current rules6. This suggests that one
can reduce funding without losing valuable projects. It requires the design
of a mechanism that induces applicants to compete by lowering their request
for funding.
We propose two such mechanisms: one sealed–bid and one open descending–
bid mechanism. Both mechanisms are auction–like in the sense that appli-
cants compete with their requests for funding which can be viewed as their
bids and the mechanism selects the best allocation that can be funded with
the given budget.
To carry out their project as stated in the application, the applicant requires
a certain amount of subsidization, which is denoted by zi. The fact that zi is
private information motivates the use of the auction mechanisms. An auc-
tioneer knowing zi could directly implement the optimal allocation, namely
ao ∈ arg max
a∈A

U(a) |
∑
i∈a
zi ≤ B

 , (3)
by funding each applicant in the allocation exactly at the required level to
implement its project.
Each applicant now submits a bid bi according to one of the following two
mechanisms.
3.1. Sealed–Bid Mechanism
The sealed–bid mechanism is characterized by the following allocation and
pricing rules:
1. Each applicant i ∈ P makes a sealed bid bi ∈ [0, si]
7, without knowing
the bids made by others. Bids are requests for funding.
2. On the basis of the given bids b = (b1, . . . , bn), the mechanism
6An applicant who requires more than si would not apply because he would not be
able to carry out the project as stated in the application. In most programs there is close
monitoring by program managers such that applicants are not able to change the nature
of their project significantly once the application is accepted.
7Notice that the maximum bid is set to si. This maximum bid restriction is discussed in
Section 3.3.
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(a) selects the allocation, a∗, that solves the maximization problem8
a∗ ∈ arg max
a∈A

U(a) |
∑
i∈a
bi ≤ B

 . (4)
(b) pays a subsidy equal to bi if i ∈ a
∗ and equal to zero otherwise.
3.2. Open Descending–Bid Mechanism
The second mechanism is an open descending–bid auction which consists
of several “rounds.”
1. Each applicant i faces his own price clock that starts at si. Subse-
quently, the reading of the price clock declines at rate ∆ in each round.
2. The final bid bi of applicant i is the price where he stops his price
clock. After stopping the price clock, applicants are not allowed to
lower their bid any further. Applicants can see others’ price clocks at
any time and can always observe if other applicants have stopped in
an earlier round.
3. On the basis of the given bids b = (b1, . . . , bn), the mechanism selects
the allocation as in the sealed–bid mechanism.
Proposal 2 Use either the sealed–bid or the open descending–bid mecha-
nism. This induces competition for funding.
3.3. Maximum Bid Restriction
It is advisable to structure the auction in such a way that its outcome can
never be inferior to the outcome that would be reached if one would apply
Proposal 1 only, without an auction.
This can be achieved by setting individual maximum bids equal to the sub-
sidy rates si that would be granted according to the current subsidy rules.
Therefore, we propose
Proposal 3 If one uses one of the auction mechanisms, set each applicant’s
maximum bid equal to the subsidy rate that would be granted according to
the current subsidy rules (which we denoted by si).
In policy advice one should always try to make proposals that cannot yield
an outcome inferior to that achieved by the status quo practice. To achieve
this is the only purpose of Proposal 3.
Notice that we already incorporated this proposal in the two auction mech-
anisms described before.
8If a∗ is not unique, it selects the allocation that minimizes
∑
i∈a∗ bi; if the result is still
not unique, it selects at random.
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3.4. An Example of an Open Descending–Bid Auction
The following example illustrates the working of the open descending–bid
mechanism (see Table 1). It assumes a budget of 70, a bidding decrement of
5, and five applicants (1 to 5). Projects are substitutes and have the utilities
stated in column 2. The associated minimum subsidies (zi) are stated in
column 3, and the subsidies si that would be granted if no auction were
used in column 4. Bold numbers indicate which applicants would be part of
the allocation if the auction would stop at the current round. If no auction
were used, the allocation would be {1,2}, with total utility 100.
Applicant Utility zi si Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
1 53 20 40 35 30 25
2 47 20 30 25 20 20
3 38 20 30 25 20 20
4 37 10 25 20 15 10
5 35 15 25 20 15 15
a {1,2} {2,3,4} {2,3,4,5} {1,2,4,5}
U(a) 100 122 157 172
Table 1: Example of an Open Auction
This example assumes that all applicants stop their price clocks at round
three. The auction ends with allocation a∗ = {1,2,4,5}. The example illus-
trates how an applicant, in the course of an auction, can be crowded out at
some round and return to the allocation in a later round. The last row of
the table states the total utility of the respective allocations. The optimal
allocation is {1,2,3,4}, and the maximum feasible utility is 175.
3.5. The nature of the auction problem
The present auction problem can be viewed as that of a multi–unit pro-
curer (auctioneer) facing several single–unit suppliers (bidders), where both
the auctioneer and bidders are budget–constrained. Moreover, the supplied
goods can be viewed as heterogeneous. To the best of our knowledge such
a problem has not been studied before, neither in the theoretical nor in the
experimental auctions literature. There is a literature on standard single-
and multi-unit auctions with budget constrained bidders (see Che and Gale
(1998), Laffont and Robert (1996) for the single-unit case, and Benoît and
Krishna (2001) for the multi-unit case). However, a budget constrained auc-
tioneer, which is of crucial importance in the present framework, has never
been considered. Its game theoretic analysis raises a number of technical
complications.
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4. monte carlo simulation
The simulation is designed to assess the benefit of switching from a selection
based on an ranking of individual projects to a global decision procedure
that is based on a ranking of allocations, as recommended in Proposal 1.
Notice that adding an auction mechanism, as proposed in Proposal 2, gives
rise to further improvements.
The simulation is designed as follows: We consider a pool of 250 projects
and a given budget of B = 1000. Each project has two characteristics: its
grade (either A or B), which is drawn independently with equal probability,
and the status quo subsidy, si, which is drawn independently from a uniform
distribution with support (0,B). The program manager’s preferences are
characterized by a fixed equivalence rule eB which indicates that eB grade A
projects are equivalent to one grade B project.
We wrote a VBA program for Microsoft Excel that draws the grade of each
project and its parameter si at random and then computes the two alloca-
tions, the status quo allocation and the allocation based on Proposal 1. This
procedure is repeated 1000 times to obtain an empirical distribution of se-
lected allocations9 for different equivalence rules eB ∈ {0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9,0.99}.
The results of these simulations are presented in Figure 1 in the form of cu-
mulative distribution functions, F(x). There, F(x) denotes the probability
that Proposal 1 gives rise to a relative gain in the value of the selected alloca-
tion of x or less. The value of an allocation is computed as nA+eBnB , where
(nA, nB) denotes the number of A and B projects in the respective alloca-
tion. And the relative gain in value is computed by dividing the increment
in value due to switching from status quo allocation, as , to the allocation
based on Proposal 1, ap, by the value of the status quo allocation, as .
Evidently, the relative value gains increase, in the sense of first-order sto-
chastic dominance, if B projects become more valuable relative toA projects.
This is plausible, because giving absolute priority to type A projects, as the
status quo preference rule does, becomes more costly as projects become
closer substitutes.
5. experiments
In order to test the two auction mechanisms we set up a series of comput-
erized lab experiments.10 There, subjects were assigned to play the role
of a firm that applies for an R&D subsidy. They either participated in the
sealed–bid or in the open descending–bid mechanism. In the experiment,
we used a simple grading scheme for projects as proposed above, with only
two grades.
9That program code is available upon request from the authors.
10For instructions and screenshots see Giebe et al. (2005).
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Figure 1: CDFs of relative value gains due to Proposal 1
5.1. Experimental Design
In the experiment, we formed groups of six subjects participating in one
of the two mechanisms. Prior to the auction, each subject i was given the
following private information (zi, pii, si, g(i)):
1. the minimum subsidy needed to execute one’s project, zi;
2. the private profit earned in addition to the subsidy if one’s project is
executed, pii;
3. the maximum (resp. starting) bid, si;
4. the grade of one’s project, g(i), either A or B.
The smallest monetary unit was 1 ECU (experimental currency unit).
Each subject was informed that (zi, pii, si) were independently drawn from
uniform distributions with supports zi ∈ {0,1, . . . ,5}, pii ∈ {0,1, . . . ,10},
si ∈ {5,6, . . . ,10}, and that there would be three grade–A and three grade–B
projects, assigned to subjects with equal probability.
The following information was given to all subjects:
1. the budget B = 20,
2. the preference ranking over possible allocations:
{A,A,A, B, B, B}  {A,A,A, B, B}  {A,A, B, B, B} 
{A,A,A, B}  {A,A, B, B}  {A,B, B, B} 
{A,A,A}  {A,A, B}  {A,B, B}  (5)
{B, B, B}  {A,A}  {A,B} 
{B, B}  {A}  {B}.
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In the sealed–bid auction subjects were asked to enter their requested sub-
sidy, bi, referred to as “bid” in a computer screen window. After all bids
were submitted, the software computed the best feasible allocation, based
on the above preference ranking, according to the rules described in section
4. Those subjects who were part of the allocation received a credit equal to
bi +pii ECU; all others received no credit.
The open descending–bid auction was set up as a clock auction. There, each
subject had its own price clock, starting at the maximum bid si and decreas-
ing at the fixed rate of one ECU per round. In each round, we first asked
the grade–A subjects to make simultaneous bids; then, all grade–B subjects
observed the bids of all A subjects, and made their own simultaneous bids.
There, a bid means that one either freezes the current reading of one’s price
clock or accepts a reduction by one ECU. This procedure continued until all
subjects had stopped their price clock.
A subject who stopped its price clock in one round was not able to “unfreeze”
it later. In each round, the active grade–A subjects could see the current
reading of the price clocks of all subjects and who had already stopped its
price clock in which previous round and at which price. Similarly, the active
grade–B subjects could see the current reading of the price clocks of all
subjects, which subjects had stopped in previous rounds, and, in addition,
which grade–A subjects stopped in the current round.
When all subjects had stopped their price clock, the final bids b were the lev-
els at which the individual price clocks had been stopped; the auction ended,
and the software computed the best feasible allocation by the same rule as
in the sealed–bid auction. Those subjects who were part of the allocation
earned a credit of bi +pii ECU; all others received no credit.
5.2. Experimental Procedure
The experiments were conducted in November 2003 at the Department of
Economics, Humboldt University at Berlin. The subjects were 96 student
volunteers. They were recruited by advertisements in lectures and by mail
shots. Most of them were undergraduate economics or business students.
The treatments were computerized using the experimental software “z-tree”
developed by Fischbacher (1999).
We conducted eight sessions. Four sessions were dedicated to the sealed–
bid auction, and another four sessions to the open descending–bid auction.
In each session there were twelve distinct subjects.
Instructions and Trial Auction After being seated at a computer terminal,
subjects were given written instructions including a detailed example.
In the instructions we referred to an allocation as a “combination,” to a
subsidy as a “grant,” and to an applicant as a “bidder” in order to keep
the terminology as neutral as possible without making it unduly difficult to
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understand the mechanism. We made clear that all decisions would be taken
anonymously and that identities would not be revealed.
Two control questions checked whether the instructions were understood
by all subjects. These control questions were computerized, with feedback
for incorrect answers. Then, a “trial auction” was played which did not count
for earnings.
Assignment of Subjects to Payoff–Relevant Auctions A session consisted of
two parallel sequences of five auctions, each played by six subjects. After
each auction subjects were randomly and anonymously reassigned to one
of the two groups playing the next auction.
After each auction subjects were privately informed about their earnings. In
order to reduce path dependencies, subjects were not told which allocation
was selected.
At the end of the session subjects got a summary account of their earnings,
and earnings were paid, including a show–up fee.
Payoffs A typical sealed–bid session took 40 and an open descending–bid
session 90 minutes. Each subject’s earnings in ECU were converted into e
at the rate 9 ECU = e1; in addition, subjects earned a show–up fee of e4 in
a sealed–bid and e10 in a descending–bid session.
In sealed–bid sessions earnings were between e5.90 and e11, with an aver-
age of e8.40, and in the open descending–bid sessions between e11.70 and
e17.40, with an average of e14.40.
6. results
Altogether, 96 subjects participated in 8 sessions with a total of 78 payoff–
relevant auctions.11 The trial auctions are not considered in our analysis.
As groups were rematched in every auction, subjects were able to learn from
each other’s behavior. Because of this, the results within a session are not in-
dependent. Hence, each treatment consists of 4 independent observations,
one per session.
Since the set of independent observations is relatively small, we perform a
mainly descriptive data analysis.
Of course, each auction resulted in one of the allocations stated in equation
(5). These allocations are ranked by assigning a number r ∈ {1, . . . ,15},
where r = 1 stands for {A,A,A, B, B, B}, r = 2 for {A,A,A, B, B, B}, etc. For
convenience of notation we refer to the rank of the implemented allocation
11Actually, 80 auctions took place. However, due to a network problem, the data of 2
of the open descending–bid auctions were lost. Subjects were only informed after the
experiment. They received a lump–sum payment of e2 for the third auction where the
problem occurred. We therefore think that the data from the remaining auctions can be
analyzed.
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as r∗, that of the optimal allocation as r o, and that of the allocation that
would be implemented if all bids were equal to the maximum bids as rp.
As it happened, the optimal allocation was {A,A,A, B, B, B} in 70 of the 78
auctions and {A,A,A, B, B} in the remaining eight auctions.
Table 2 indicates which allocations were implemented in the experiments.
Allocations Sealed–Bid Open Descending–Bid
(ordered by rank r ) Frequency % Frequency %
1 : {A,A,A, B, B, B} 3 7.5 6 15.8
2 : {A,A,A, B, B} 22 55 20 52.7
3 : {A,A, B, B, B} 6 15 3 7.9
4 : {A,A,A, B} 8 20 9 23.7
5 : {A,A, B, B} 1 2.5 0 0
Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Implemented Allocations
The further presentation and interpretation of the experimental results is
ordered by the following hypotheses:
1. The auction improves the allocation: We explore to what extent the
allocation improves relative to the allocation that would be reached if
one adopted our Proposal 1 but not also Proposals 2 and 3.
2. The auction is almost efficient: We explore how close the observed al-
locations are to the corresponding optimal allocations.
3. “Handicapped” bidders play more aggressively: We explore whether
and if so to what extent grade–B bidders bid lower.
4. Higher private profits give rise to more aggressive bidding: We explore
whether and if so to what extent bidders with a higher private profit
submit lower bids.
5. More experience gives rise to more aggressive bidding: We explore
whether bidders bid lower in later auctions in the sequence after gain-
ing some experience.
Improvement due to the auction Figure 2 indicates that competition is ef-
fective. Bids are, on average, substantially below the maximum bids. Ap-
proximately 33% of all bids are even equal to the respective minimum bids.
Average bids are slightly lower in the open descending–bid mechanism.12
Therefore, both mechanisms induce a remarkable intensity of competition.
We measure the improvement due to the auction by computing the average
difference between the rank rp and that of the implemented allocation, r∗,
i.e., |r∗ − rp|. In the sealed–bid mechanism that measure is equal to 5.78
12Wilcoxon Rank–Sum tests using the difference in average bids in the two mechanisms
(n = 8) confirm our result on the 10%-significance level.
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Figure 2: Average Bids
and in the open descending–bid mechanism equal to 5.89.13 On average
the auction increases the number of subsidized projects, relative to the al-
location ap, by 2.04. This indicates that adding the auction brings about a
remarkable improvement.
Efficiency We call the outcome first–best if an auction implements the al-
location ao, i.e., if r∗ = ro. Similarly, we call it second–best or higher if
r∗ = ro + 1 resp. r∗ > ro + 1.
We measure the deviation from the first–best by computing the average dif-
ference between the ranks of the optimal and the implemented allocations,
r∗− ro. In the sealed–bid mechanism that measure is equal to 1.45 and in
the open descending–bid mechanism 1.31. This indicates that the auctions
implement allocations that are close to the efficient ones.
Figure 3 summarizes the efficiency properties of both mechanisms. Without
the auction, the implemented allocation would have been, on average, 8th–
best. Thus, the deviation from efficiency is considerably smaller than the
deviation from the allocations that would be reached without the auction.
”Handicapped Bidders“ Figures 4 and 5 show that grade–A applicants bid
higher on average. This applies to all eight sessions. Specifically, in the
sealed–bid auction, grade–A bidders bid 27% higher on average and in the
open descending–bid auction 12% higher.14
Private Profits Intuitively, higher private profits should induce lower bids
because those bidders should care more about getting the minimum fund-
13The average difference between r∗ and the rank of the status quo allocation, i.e., the
allocation that would be reached without using any of our proposals, is 6.1 on average.
14Wilcoxon Signed–Rank Tests (n=4) confirm these results for both mechanisms on a
5%–significance level.
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Figure 3: Efficiency Results
Figure 4: Average Bids in the Sealed–Bid Mechanism
Figure 5: Average Bids in the Open Descending–Bid Auction
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Figure 6: Efficiency in Late Auctions
ing needed to get their project off the ground, rather than about collecting
unnecessarily high subsidies.
The coefficients for the correlation between private profit and the bid are
ρpi,b = −0.1 for the sealed–bid mechanism and ρpi,b = −0.15 for the open
descending–bid mechanism. The negative sign does indeed confirm this
conjecture. However, the observed correlation is rather weak.
Experienced Bidders In the sealed–bid mechanism, average bids remain fairly
stable during a session. However, in the open descending–bid mechanism
the average bid in the first auction of each sequence is 15.7% higher than
in the final one. From the fact that in the first rounds, bids across mech-
anisms are fairly similar and that the additional information given in the
open descending bid mechanism (maximum bids of other bidders) does not
have a significant impact on bids (correlation coefficients are near zero and
unsystematic), we conclude that the improvement in the open descending-
bid mechanism is due to experience from observing the behavior of other
bidders.
Figure 6 states the outcomes of the fourth and fifth auction of each se-
quence, i.e., after bidders have acquired some experience. It indicates that
experience induces more competitive bidding, resulting in a higher degree
of efficiency. However, this improvement due to experience is more pro-
nounced in the open descending–bid mechanism.15
15A Wilcoxon Signed–Rank test on the 5%–significance level (n = 4) confirms our result:
For the open descending–bid mechanism, bids during the first two auctions of each se-
quence are significantly higher than in the final two. For the sealed–bid mechanism, the
hypothesis of significantly higher bids in the first two auctions of each sequence is rejected.
Our observations are based on only 32 “late” auctions, 16 per treatment. A more extensive
series of experiments would be required to check the robustness of these results.
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Not surprisingly, players lower their bids after they lose an auction. This
learning effect is particulary strong in the sealed–bid auction. In fact, after
losing an auction bids are on average reduced by 33.7% in the sealed–bid
auction and by 16.7% in the open auction. And 73.7% of all losers respond
in this way in the sealed–bid and 62.5% in the open auction.
7. summary
The present paper analyzes the allocation of subsidies to fund socially valu-
able projects that are not feasible without subsidy. Applications range from
R&D subsidies to the funding of charitable projects and academic fellow-
ships. Typically, these allocation decisions are based on a ranking of indi-
vidual projects, and subsidies are awarded successively to the best projects
until the budget is exhausted. Thereby, the awarded subsidies are often a
lump–sum payment or a fixed share of the estimated project cost.
We identify two sources of inefficiency of the commonly used funding pro-
cedures and propose better mechanisms that may remedy them. The high-
lights of our proposals can be summarized by two recommendations, the
first of which can be implemented without the second:
• Select projects on the basis of a ranking of complete allocations rather
than on a ranking of individual projects, possibly using a simplified
ranking procedure.
• Induce applicants to reveal information about their true need for fund-
ing and use that information. This can be done by employing some
form of an auction in which applicants bid for subsidies.
Ideally the first proposal involves using a complete ranking of allocations.
But this is generally too complex. Therefore, we recommend the use of
simple grading schemes, combined with fixed equivalence rules. This will
generally improve the allocation relative to the currently used selection pro-
cedure (which implicitly assumes lexicographic preferences) without raising
the level of complexity.
We test the first proposal by means of a Monte Carlo Simulation. We show
that especially if projects are close substitutes, a ranking of allocations
brings about a substantial efficiency gain compared to the currently used
ranking of individual projects.
As for the second proposal, two specific auction mechanisms are tested in a
controlled lab experiment. In our experiment, both mechanisms implement
a high level of competition between applicants and thus lead to a substantial
efficiency gain which becomes stronger as bidders gain experience. Thereby,
the highest efficiency gains are realized by adopting an open descending–bid
mechanism.
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8. discussion
Whilst quality competition for Subsidies is already commonly applied and
accepted (see e.g. Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005)), significant doubt has
been expressed by program managers regarding the proposed extension of
competition between applicants to the dimension of money. However, our
results suggest that adopting our proposals may give rise to substantial im-
provements. Put differently, assessing quality independently from its cost
makes no sense and produces inefficiencies.
However, we must stress that we evaluate the impact of our proposed mech-
anisms assuming a given set of projects. This ignores that the proposed
change in selection rules may affect the proposed projects. If applicants
anticipate that they compete not only in terms of project quality but also
in terms of the requested amount of funding, they may propose different
projects that are better targeted to the preferences of the selection commit-
tee. The fear was expressed that this may lead to projects with lower quality.
However, we must stress that we do not propose to neglect quality in the
assessment of projects. The weighting of quality and price for the assign-
ment of subsidies can be set according to program manager’s preferences,
e.g. by designing appropriate grade and equivalence rule schemes.
Of course, if contracts are incomplete, firms may not live up to what they
have proposed in the application. Program mangers often expressed the
concern that this danger increases with a decreasing subsidy. However, we
think that due to the close monitoring of firms in the current system this
problem can be solved, e.g. by agreeing on fines for the case of noncom-
pliance. Moreover, we doubt that the implementation of our proposals and
the associated reduction of subsidy rates can be causal for such problems.
The reason is that the incentive to downgrade the proposed project and to
divert parts of the subsidy to other, possibly more profitable, activities, is
already present in the current system. The underlying problems of contract-
ing and monitoring must be addressed, but this has little if any relation to
our proposals.
Another issue is that our proposals may lead to an increased number of
funded projects, at a lower average level of reimbursed project costs. This
means that the ex ante expected payoff from participating in the program
does not change for the firms as long as the program budget is kept con-
stant. However, administrative costs may increase because more projects
are funded and thus more projects have to be administered and supervised.
Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005) have criticized the current pure quality com-
petition for its inability to support less able applicants, e.g. in lagging re-
gions. Our approach is at least partly able to correct this flaw in that it
increases the chances for lower quality projects to receive funding, albeit at
a lower rate of subsidization.
Despite its obvious flaws, administrators are probably reluctant to change
the current selection procedure. From our experience we see two main rea-
sons. First, program managers are not aware of the obvious flaws, and are
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not trained to think in terms of allocations. Second, the current practice
gives them considerably more leeway. No one can be expected to give up
such power on his own initiative. Therefore, the policymaker must be re-
minded to exercise his power to make rules, and not delegate it to those who
execute them. Unfortunately, this obvious principle is frequently violated
in the public sector.
Results from an opinion survey conducted among German firms that have
applied for a subsidy in the past, suggest that the majority of firms would be
ready to accept proposals as made in this paper16. Remarkably, acceptance
among small firms and those with a low equity endowment is strongest. We
note, however, that the acceptance of an open mechanism is weaker. This
may be due to the fact that it reveals private information not only to the
auctioneer but also to competitors. We therefore think that especially in a
framework where several competing firms participate in the same auction,
the use of closed mechanisms may be more advisable because this avoids
the mentioned problem.
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